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[P$YCH0]

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"In his final psychopathological classification (Freud, 1924a,b), Freud retakes the consecrated designation of “psychosis,” which now included pictures of schizophrenia and paranoia, leaving the term “narcissistic neurosis” to refer only to pictures of melancholia. In the article “Neurosis and psychosis” (Freud, 1924a) and “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” (Freud, 1924b), the thinker distinguishes these two concepts using the hypotheses proposed 1 year earlier, in “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 1923): “Neurosis and Psychosis,” for instance, proposes a topic differentiation based on “The Ego and the Id” and, thus, proposes a third picture, namely the “narcissistic neuroses.” While transference neurosis presents a conflict between ego and id and the psychoses present a conflict between the ego and the external world, the narcissistic neuroses consist on a conflict between ego and superego. This brief introduction to the long trajectory of Freudian investigation does not make justice to its subtleties and theoretical oscillations, but may be useful for the focalization of a moment of crucial transformation in his comprehension of psychosis. This moment is represented mainly by two exceptionally fecund metapsychological texts (written almost simultaneously, but published within a 2 years interval): “The Unconscious” (Freud, 1915a) and “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917). It is known that, during the First Topography (Freud, 1900–1920), Freud manifested great interest in the “Psychoneuroses of Defense.” However, after acknowledging the existence of narcissism, he started using the term “Narcissistic Neurosis” to define the clinical experience of psychosis, based on metapsychology, and psychopathology. The concept of transference represents, in this perspective, the defining criteria for the two types of psychoneurosis, namely, transference neurosis and narcissistic neurosis. In the narcissistic neuroses with reflux of libido, there is a barrier for an effective process of transference, that is, the transference bond with the analyst does not occur, and the libido gets repressed. Nonetheless, this review article focuses, mainly, in presenting the Freudian thoughts on psychosis and its articulation with the concept of unconscious and the issue of the other, explaining, thus, the focus on “The Unconscious” (Freud, 1915a). The phenomena of the unconscious episodically cross the neurotic individual and announce, through various symptoms, dreams, and faulty acts, the discontinuity in the egoic functioning. In the psychotic individual’s case, these phenomena are even more common, appearing continuously and massively in their lives. These individuals appear to be constantly invaded by the other which bursts inside of him/her and often presents itself as a threat to the process of construction of this person’s identity. In the aforementioned 1915 article, Freud develops an association between the schizophrenic’s conscious speech and the oneiric processes through which this individual goes. He concluded that the psychic processes of psychosis are subject to the primary process, to a free flow of energy which announces a regression to the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire (Wunsch): in the case of schizophrenia, the individual regresses to auto-erotism; and, in the case of paranoia, he/she regresses to primary narcissism. This fixation with the primary process, which is ruled by the principle of pleasure, produces a schism with reality that compromises a wide range of gains originated by the principle of reality. Skills such as attention, judgment, and rational thinking are lost when there is a schism with reality in the psychotic mind. According to Freud, this is a difference between neurotic and psychotic individuals: while the first do not repudiate reality (they only ignore it), the latter not only repudiate it, but try to replace it (Freud, 1924b). In this perspective, the author notices that “all observers have been struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be shown to be present in the Ucs. [Unconscious] by psycho-analysis1” (Freud, 1915b). This statement led to the proposition of the hypothesis that, in narcissistic psychoneuroses (psychoses), one can witness the “unconscious open to the sky,” since words explicitly and directly reveal unconscious content. However, Freud also shows that the character of strangeness of schizophrenia results from the predominance of word-representation (Wortvorstellung) over thing-representation (Sachvorstellung). The second proposition seems to contradict the hypothesis which simply defines psychosis and unconscious. Word-representation, articulated with thing-representation, belongs to the preconscious and is what makes communication with the outside world possible. In the unconscious, on the other hand, this articulation between word-representation and thing-representation does not exist: only thing-representation is observed. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that, if in psychosis there is a domain of word-representation over thing-representation, and the first is absent in the unconscious, it is not correct to affirm that psychosis is a direct expression of the unconscious, or the unconscious “open to the sky.” Nonetheless, a doubt soon came to Freud’s mind: how can we affirm the presence of the unconscious in psychosis if there has been a rejection of castration (Verwerfung), and repression has not taken place? On the one hand, the unconscious system is ruled by the primary process. Since the psychotic individual’s psychic apparatus is also ruled by the primary process, with a domain of the principle of pleasure over the principle of reality, it can be hypothesized that there is a predominance of the unconscious system in cases of psychosis. On the other hand, the theory of psychic apparatus, developed in Freud’s First Topography, had established a structural relation between the unconscious and repression. Is it possible to conclude, thus, that this affirmation of the First Topography is incorrect and the immediate association between unconscious and repression should be abandoned? It can be noticed that, by facing the issue of psychosis, Freud was obligated to review and question metapsychology. He, then, introduced the concept of Id as a possible response for such crucial matters. It appears, hence, that in psychosis repression keeps on operating as a primal repression (Urverdrängung), but a later incidence or proper repression and its effect of psychic splitting would also be seriously affected. In this perspective, the unconscious in psychosis can be understood in a dynamic and economic manner, but not in a topic way. There is no structural splitting in the two great systems, which means that the preconscious does not censor the unconscious contents and the borders are rather fluid. Nevertheless, a clear manifestation of this structural absence of barriers, i.e., limits that circumscribe different systems, only occurs after a first episode in which the individual is taken over by the other, by a stranger who inhabits his/her body. Therefore, it is very common for the psychotics not to recognize themselves and speak of themselves in the third person. But how would this refusal of reality occur in the perspective of the First Topography? It is possible to suggest that the perception of external objects results from a combination of word-representation and thing-representation, an articulation which takes place in the preconscious system. In psychosis, the perception and interpretation of reality fail, since, instead of being libidinously invested in the preconscious system, the thing-representation occurs in the unconscious. This means that the preconscious system is invaded by the unconscious in a search for primitive forms of libidinous satisfaction, such as hallucination. It is more of an invasion performed by the unconscious than a topic regression to the unconscious, although it can be argued that there is a temporal regression to archaic forms of egoic organization, such as auto-erotism , and primary narcissism. Temporal regression and primitive forms of satisfaction help the individual bypass frustration and are impregnating, as they represent means of self-satisfaction and the capability of autistically finding satisfaction. Freud’s image of a bird’s egg, with its provision of food inside the shell (Freud, 1911a), can well illustrate these psychotic mechanisms. In schizophrenia, object-cathexes are abandoned through the annulment of preconscious thing-representation: only an intensely invested word-representation remains. However, as the thing-representations inscribed in the unconscious, the primitive object-cathexes have proximity with word-representation, revealing a strange phenomenon in which words and things are equal. In this perspective, in psychosis, the words turn into things, i.e., the psychotic speech is characterized by a concreteness which interferes in the symbolic procedures of communicational language. In summary, this structural weakening of the psychic apparatus splitting, which prevents the distinction and articulation of unconscious thing-representation and preconscious word-representation, worsened by the emptying of preconscious thing-representation, distorts the perception of external reality and, more especially, hampers a socially shared interpretation of this reality. In psychosis, there is commonly an imaginary mold and a concrete understanding of culture’s symbolic net."
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valeriyageorg
@valeriyageorg set a listing price of 0.001 L-BTC for [P$YCH0]
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About this artwork

"In his final psychopathological classification (Freud, 1924a,b), Freud retakes the consecrated designation of “psychosis,” which now included pictures of schizophrenia and paranoia, leaving the term “narcissistic neurosis” to refer only to pictures of melancholia. In the article “Neurosis and psychosis” (Freud, 1924a) and “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” (Freud, 1924b), the thinker distinguishes these two concepts using the hypotheses proposed 1 year earlier, in “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 1923): “Neurosis and Psychosis,” for instance, proposes a topic differentiation based on “The Ego and the Id” and, thus, proposes a third picture, namely the “narcissistic neuroses.” While transference neurosis presents a conflict between ego and id and the psychoses present a conflict between the ego and the external world, the narcissistic neuroses consist on a conflict between ego and superego. This brief introduction to the long trajectory of Freudian investigation does not make justice to its subtleties and theoretical oscillations, but may be useful for the focalization of a moment of crucial transformation in his comprehension of psychosis. This moment is represented mainly by two exceptionally fecund metapsychological texts (written almost simultaneously, but published within a 2 years interval): “The Unconscious” (Freud, 1915a) and “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917). It is known that, during the First Topography (Freud, 1900–1920), Freud manifested great interest in the “Psychoneuroses of Defense.” However, after acknowledging the existence of narcissism, he started using the term “Narcissistic Neurosis” to define the clinical experience of psychosis, based on metapsychology, and psychopathology. The concept of transference represents, in this perspective, the defining criteria for the two types of psychoneurosis, namely, transference neurosis and narcissistic neurosis. In the narcissistic neuroses with reflux of libido, there is a barrier for an effective process of transference, that is, the transference bond with the analyst does not occur, and the libido gets repressed. Nonetheless, this review article focuses, mainly, in presenting the Freudian thoughts on psychosis and its articulation with the concept of unconscious and the issue of the other, explaining, thus, the focus on “The Unconscious” (Freud, 1915a). The phenomena of the unconscious episodically cross the neurotic individual and announce, through various symptoms, dreams, and faulty acts, the discontinuity in the egoic functioning. In the psychotic individual’s case, these phenomena are even more common, appearing continuously and massively in their lives. These individuals appear to be constantly invaded by the other which bursts inside of him/her and often presents itself as a threat to the process of construction of this person’s identity. In the aforementioned 1915 article, Freud develops an association between the schizophrenic’s conscious speech and the oneiric processes through which this individual goes. He concluded that the psychic processes of psychosis are subject to the primary process, to a free flow of energy which announces a regression to the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire (Wunsch): in the case of schizophrenia, the individual regresses to auto-erotism; and, in the case of paranoia, he/she regresses to primary narcissism. This fixation with the primary process, which is ruled by the principle of pleasure, produces a schism with reality that compromises a wide range of gains originated by the principle of reality. Skills such as attention, judgment, and rational thinking are lost when there is a schism with reality in the psychotic mind. According to Freud, this is a difference between neurotic and psychotic individuals: while the first do not repudiate reality (they only ignore it), the latter not only repudiate it, but try to replace it (Freud, 1924b). In this perspective, the author notices that “all observers have been struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be shown to be present in the Ucs. [Unconscious] by psycho-analysis1” (Freud, 1915b). This statement led to the proposition of the hypothesis that, in narcissistic psychoneuroses (psychoses), one can witness the “unconscious open to the sky,” since words explicitly and directly reveal unconscious content. However, Freud also shows that the character of strangeness of schizophrenia results from the predominance of word-representation (Wortvorstellung) over thing-representation (Sachvorstellung). The second proposition seems to contradict the hypothesis which simply defines psychosis and unconscious. Word-representation, articulated with thing-representation, belongs to the preconscious and is what makes communication with the outside world possible. In the unconscious, on the other hand, this articulation between word-representation and thing-representation does not exist: only thing-representation is observed. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that, if in psychosis there is a domain of word-representation over thing-representation, and the first is absent in the unconscious, it is not correct to affirm that psychosis is a direct expression of the unconscious, or the unconscious “open to the sky.” Nonetheless, a doubt soon came to Freud’s mind: how can we affirm the presence of the unconscious in psychosis if there has been a rejection of castration (Verwerfung), and repression has not taken place? On the one hand, the unconscious system is ruled by the primary process. Since the psychotic individual’s psychic apparatus is also ruled by the primary process, with a domain of the principle of pleasure over the principle of reality, it can be hypothesized that there is a predominance of the unconscious system in cases of psychosis. On the other hand, the theory of psychic apparatus, developed in Freud’s First Topography, had established a structural relation between the unconscious and repression. Is it possible to conclude, thus, that this affirmation of the First Topography is incorrect and the immediate association between unconscious and repression should be abandoned? It can be noticed that, by facing the issue of psychosis, Freud was obligated to review and question metapsychology. He, then, introduced the concept of Id as a possible response for such crucial matters. It appears, hence, that in psychosis repression keeps on operating as a primal repression (Urverdrängung), but a later incidence or proper repression and its effect of psychic splitting would also be seriously affected. In this perspective, the unconscious in psychosis can be understood in a dynamic and economic manner, but not in a topic way. There is no structural splitting in the two great systems, which means that the preconscious does not censor the unconscious contents and the borders are rather fluid. Nevertheless, a clear manifestation of this structural absence of barriers, i.e., limits that circumscribe different systems, only occurs after a first episode in which the individual is taken over by the other, by a stranger who inhabits his/her body. Therefore, it is very common for the psychotics not to recognize themselves and speak of themselves in the third person. But how would this refusal of reality occur in the perspective of the First Topography? It is possible to suggest that the perception of external objects results from a combination of word-representation and thing-representation, an articulation which takes place in the preconscious system. In psychosis, the perception and interpretation of reality fail, since, instead of being libidinously invested in the preconscious system, the thing-representation occurs in the unconscious. This means that the preconscious system is invaded by the unconscious in a search for primitive forms of libidinous satisfaction, such as hallucination. It is more of an invasion performed by the unconscious than a topic regression to the unconscious, although it can be argued that there is a temporal regression to archaic forms of egoic organization, such as auto-erotism , and primary narcissism. Temporal regression and primitive forms of satisfaction help the individual bypass frustration and are impregnating, as they represent means of self-satisfaction and the capability of autistically finding satisfaction. Freud’s image of a bird’s egg, with its provision of food inside the shell (Freud, 1911a), can well illustrate these psychotic mechanisms. In schizophrenia, object-cathexes are abandoned through the annulment of preconscious thing-representation: only an intensely invested word-representation remains. However, as the thing-representations inscribed in the unconscious, the primitive object-cathexes have proximity with word-representation, revealing a strange phenomenon in which words and things are equal. In this perspective, in psychosis, the words turn into things, i.e., the psychotic speech is characterized by a concreteness which interferes in the symbolic procedures of communicational language. In summary, this structural weakening of the psychic apparatus splitting, which prevents the distinction and articulation of unconscious thing-representation and preconscious word-representation, worsened by the emptying of preconscious thing-representation, distorts the perception of external reality and, more especially, hampers a socially shared interpretation of this reality. In psychosis, there is commonly an imaginary mold and a concrete understanding of culture’s symbolic net."
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